6 edition of The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Wester Military Strategy (Nijhoff Law Specials, V. 31) found in the catalog.
September 9, 1997
Written in English
|The Physical Object|
|Number of Pages||192|
Clausewitz, On War. Clausewitz, On War () Book II—On the Theory of War Context: () Prussian major general who first encountered war as year old lance corporal going to be a staff officer with political/military responsibilities at the very centre of the Prussian state. Major William J. Denn is a US Army military intelligence officer and a student at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a BS from the US Military Academy, an MPP from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and an MMAS from the US Army Command and General Staff College.
On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in , it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.4/5(2). Prussian general, produced what is perhaps the most famous book on the nature and theory of war. Indeed, Bernard Brodie wrote that his masterpiece On War, ‘is not simply the greatest but the only true great book on war.’ 1 Harry Summers wrote that in ‘military science On War is .
Michael Howard, “ British Grand Strategy in World War I,” in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University, ), referred to it as Clausewitz's “famous dictum,” 31; Brodie, “ A Guide,” in On War, called it the Prussian's “great dictum,” ; see also his War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, ), , and Strategy in the Missile Age. Evoking a key Clausewitzian concept, Summers argued that the Vietnamese communists had struck at America’s critical “center of gravity” in the war—not its army in the field, but the people.
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Introduction: The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy; G. de Nooy. The Clausewitzian Dictum: 2. What is Wrong with Clausewitz. van Creveld. Clausewitz, Van Creveld and the Lack of a Balanced Theory of War; J.G.
Siccama. The Society: 4. Get this from a library. The Clausewitzian dictum and the future of western military strategy. [G C de Nooy; Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen. —Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1. Clausewitz’s off-quoted dictum appears the master key to victory. It all seems so simple: just force others to comply with what you want.
The dictum is nevertheless quite wrong. Wars are fought for a : Peter Layton. 1 Introduction: The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy Gert de Nooy The Clausewitzian Dictum 2 What is Wrong with Clausewitz. Martin van Creveld 7 3 Clausewitz, Van Creveld and the Lack of a Balanced Theory of War Jan Geert Siccama 25 The Society 4 Security for the People, Security by the People: The Paradox.
Clausewitz, a Prussian general who fought against Napoleon, quite literally wrote the book on war. Published ina year after his death, On War is regarded by military experts even today as the definitive study of warfare. His ideas remain widely taught in military schools, and are, more than ever, essential to the modern strategist.
The Clausewitzian Creed With armed hostility seemingly imminent, his dictum that the military be subservient to the civilian government hardly seems radical.
His book "On Strategy. Book I is entitled "On the Nature of War"; Book II "On the Theory of War"; Book III "On Strategy in General"; Book IV "The Engagement"; Book V "Military Forces"; Book VI "defence"; Book VII "The Attack"; and finally, Book VIII "War Plans".
Clausewitz invested 12 years writing On War but did not finish it at the time of his death in It had. CLAUSEWITZ: TOWARD A THEORY OF APPLIED STRATEGY.
by Antulio J. Echevarria II. Concerned that an early death might prematurely terminate his masterwork, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote a number of introductory notes describing the purpose of his manuscript and the direction he intended to take with future such notes inform our understanding of On War and Clausewitz's.
Clausewitzian terms. ‘War,’ Carl von Clausewitz famously asserted, ‘is simply the continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.’ii By that dictum Clausewitz described and defined a modern Western way of warfare that emphasised the need to seek a military.
The concepts Carl Von Clausewitz introduced in On War are still widely used in war colleges, strategic studies and military literature around the world. However, there have been much debate around the continued relevance of Clausewitzian concepts and his Trinity to contemporary conflicts as Martin van Creveld seems to have been right when he predicted.
Published inthe book gives numerous examples of this belief and shows that he based his theories on experience, having fought in many battles during his military career. “He regarded war as an extreme but natural expression of policy, and never regretted that he himself had fought in seven campaigns” (Paret, ).
Keywords: Clausewitz, conflict resolution, policy, security, strategy, war Abstract: This article argues that Clausewitz’s writing on war nearly years ago is still relevant for contemporary conflict resolution from at least three aspects: his idea that war is “the continuation of policy by other means”; secondly his analysis of the nature of war and the trinity theory; and finally.
Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up, Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst/New York: Columbia University Press, ) £25/$, pgs. There is a longstanding tradition in the United Kingdom of misinterpreting the Prussian soldier and theorist Clausewitz.
Liddell Hart’s mischaracterization of Clausewitz as the “Mahdi of Mass” and as the. Clausewitz's definition of strategy, as given in On War, is very unsatisfactory.
Taking his own ideas about the relationship between political aims and military means further, one is led to define strategy in relation to the degree of success in the achievement of the war aims, which must include a lasting, stable peace, the conditions of which are bearable or even satisfactory for all sides.
Our concluding remarks highlight some of the shared concerns that could inspire future engagement between military and organization strategy scholars (Kornberger, ).
First, history matters. This is the reason why more non-military historians recognize Clausewitz, and why he should be considered the Father of Modern Strategy. John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed.
Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ), This book is the best explanation I've read on the failures of American foreign policy (strategy) and American military policy (tactics without strategy).
Melton provides strong evidence and clear reasoning, which is rare. I'm not saying I agree with Melton %. And I'm not saying the book Reviews: Clausewitz diﬀerentiates between what war looks like in theory (“absolute war,” Book 1, Parts ) and what war actually looks like in practice (“real war,” Book 1, Parts ).
By comparing this theoretical version of war with reality, Clausewitz aims to identify how and why these two types of war diﬀer.
War in Theory versus War in. political and military strategy. Indeed, perhaps future historians will be able to establish a more detailed connection, albeit indirect, between the U.S. military's heightened interest in the works of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz following the Vietnam War and the unprecedented success of the war against Iran.
Alexander the Great was the embodiment of the strategic man. His genius as a strategist went far beyond the ancient battlefields, as “Alexander displayed not only tactical ingenuity and ferocity, but also political sagacity and magnanimity.” Essentially, he resembled a one-man strategy bridge, connecting the gap between the political and military himself.
This book interrogates the philosophical backdrop of Clausewitzian notions of war, and asks whether modern, network-centric militaries can still be said to serve the 'political'. In light of the emerging theories and doctrines of Network-Centric War (NCW), this book traces the philosophical backdrop against which the more common theorizations of war and its conduct take place.
With tactics from Vom Kriege used widely as military doctrine and foreign policy around the world based on Clausewitzian theories such as the paradoxical trinity and the center of gravity, it is apparent that Clausewitz’s lessons live on.
Because of this continued application to the modern world, even over years later, it is difficult to disagree with Clausewitz and the concepts of war.
Carl von Clausewitz ( to ) was a Prussian soldier, professor, and intellectual, whose combat experience and deep reflection on strategy and military theory led to the writing and posthumous publication of Vom Kriege (On War) in To this day, it is heralded as the most influential work of Western military philosophy and strategy.